Dynamics of nuclear deterrence are so paradoxical from the standpoint of game theory that they greatly stimulated development of the conflict economics in the 1960s🧵
Both the US and the USSR were able to inflict irreversible damage on each other. But there was a problem - human factor. Would you *actually* give an order to launch the nukes? If you wouldn't or nobody believes you would, it greatly reduces your power to pressure and blackmail
And vice versa. Consider that your opponent did make a strike with devastating effect for your country. But he didn't wipe out your nuclear forces completely: some of them survived the attack. Will they strike back? Pragmatically speaking, it's not in their best interest
After you nuked your enemy, best thing his nuclear forces can do, pragmatically speaking, is bargain. Negotiate some reasonable terms of surrender for themselves. Their country is (largely) gone anyway. If they strike back, humanity is doomed and they're doomed too. They know it
Paradoxically, the devastating effect of nuclear strikes leads to very counterintuitive dynamics. Yes, actors will be hesitant to make a strike. But if they did it anyway, then whatever remained of their opponents may be reluctant to strike back. That's not in their best interest
Human factor obstructs actually employing the nukes not only as the offensive, but also as a defensive weapon. If I believe that whatever remains of my opponent after my strike might not strike back (they'd rather bargain) than the entire nuclear deterrence mechanism doesn't work
Counterintuitive problems require counterintuitive solutions. So Khruchev told:
"Your generals talk of maintaining your position in Berlin with force. That is a bluff. If you send in tanks, we'll burn them. If you want a war, you'll get it. Our rockets will FLY AUTOMATICALLY"
What did he mean? Well, that's clear. The USSR was stronger conventional weapon-wise, US - nuke-wise. Ofc the USSR wanted to solve any conflicts by conventional weapons, but was concerned about American nukes. Khruchev knew that human factor largely devaluates the nuclear deterrence
Soviets found a counterintuitive solution to this problem. Which is - *limit their own choices*. Like, yeah, we surely would like to avoid the nuclear apocalypse. Sadly, we won't have such an option. If you nuke us, our rockets will fly automatically with no human factor involved
Keep reading with a 7-day free trial
Subscribe to kamilkazani to keep reading this post and get 7 days of free access to the full post archives.