US-Iranian War: a best case scenario

People are wondering what are the best options the US currently have in Iran

My answer:

Do Vietnam very quickly, quit, then make a rapprochement based on the understanding of mutual respect and recognition

(like it was in Vietnam)

That is an ill fated war, based on the completely faulty assessment of situation in Iran, and culminating the absolutely pathological tendencies in the US foreign policy.

To start with, Iran has been continuously described as an “autocracy”. So, basically, a personalist regime, headed by some kind of an “autocrat”, like Saddam Hussein or Atahualpa. Take him out, and the entire edifice falls apart like a house of cards.

Well, this theory has been tested and proven wrong. The head of state and pretty much the entire leadership were assassinated on day one, in a surprise attack, and… nothing happened. The edifice did not fall apart, and the political-cum-military machine keeps rolling, just like earlier. Which means:

Iran is not an autocracy

It is a more complex political regime, with more distributed power and mechanisms of decision making. Change of leadership, does not really change anything. That means, you have vastly overestimated the actual degree of political centralisation in the first place.

Second. Iran was seen as a ridiculous, contemptible country ruled by some kind of medieval obscurantists. That theory has been also tested, and proven wrong. Whether you like it or not, Iran is run by a remarkably intellectual elite, almost certainly more intellectual than the pithecanthropi currently sitting in the white house.

Iran is run by the people who read books

That gives them a massive advantage over the people who don’t.

Third. The regime is not “hated by everyone”, as they would try to make you believe. It, apparently, commanded quite a substantial popular support even on the height of protests. It had its own supporters and own (armed) fan base.

Now when the bombs started falling, people rally around the flag

Which is painfully obvious and painfully predictable, and has been predictable all along. Obviously, coming under the foreign attack increases the level of patriotism, and not decreases it. Obviously, people set their grievances aside. In that regard, a foreign invasion causes a major stabilising effect on the political system rather than anything else.

After this war, the regime will have more popular support than before

Everything it did, right or wrong, will be justified retrospectively, while the dissidence - that was very much alive before the bombs started falling - will be discredited as a bunch of traitors, or morons, whom you should not listen to for your own good.

Notice that everything I am saying is not just plain obvious, but has been obvious for decades. Let me quote Israel Shahak, discussing the insane, detached-from-reality state of the (Israeli) discourse on Iran, back in 1993:

Anyone not converted to the Orientalistic creed will recognize that Iran is a country very difficult to conquer, because of its size, topography and especially because of fervent nationalism combined with the religious zeal of its populace. I happen to loathe the current Iranian regime, but it doesn’t hinder me from immediately noticing how different it is from Saddam Hussein’s. Popular support for Iran’s rulers is much greater than for Iraq’s. After Saddam Hussein had invaded Iran, his troops were resisted valiantly under extremely difficult conditions. All analogies between a possible attack on Iran and the Gulf War are therefore irresponsibly fanciful. Yet Sharon and the Israeli Army commanders did in 1979 propose to send a detachment of Israeli paratroopers to Tehran to quash the revolution and restore the monarchy. They really thought, until stopped by Begin, that a few Israeli paratroopers could determine the history of a country as immense and populous as Iran! ... Later, the Israeli experts on Iranian affairs were no less unanimous in predicting a speedy defeat of Iran by Saddam Hussein. No evidence indicates that they have changed their assumptions or discarded their underlying racism. Their ranks may include some relatively less-opinionated individuals, who have survived the negative selection process which usually occurs within groups sharing such ideologically-tight imageries. But such individuals can be assumed to prefer to keep their moderation to themselves

Israel Shahak, “Israel versus Iran,” in Open Secrets: Israeli Foreign and Nuclear Policies.

So, once again, it’s not an “autocracy”, because it does not have an “autocrat”. In Iran, there is no Saddam Hussein. That suggests a more complex type of political regime, that feels less need to imbecilise and emaciate its subjects, to make them more controllable. Which means its own structures are more efficient, and have more agency. People are more loyal to the regime, and do not “rise”, when under attack, but rather rally around the flag.

Under these circumstances, a sneaky surprise attack cannot work, and degrades into a protracted war, in the very unfavourable conditions, Vietnam style. My suggestion is:

Accelerate Vietnam

Play out the Vietnamese scenario very, very fast, keeping the losses to bare minimum.

Later - not now - you will be able to build some kind of constructive relationship with Iran, on the basis of mutual recognition and respect. Right now, however, it is impossible.

Fundamentally, there is nothing particularly bad in the Vietnamese scenario, and, although it may seem like the end of the world to some (because it is, to their careers), it actually isn’t. It is much preferable to cut off one’s losses, and reconsider an ill fated policy based on the false, no, totally insane basic premises.

In fact, discarding the chickenhawks who brought you to this, may be seen as a positive good