Why is Russia winning?

and how to prevent it

You make more weaponry → You win

Contrary to the widespread misconception, a significant superiority in the sheer quantity of weaponry does translate into the military victory. The military output delta is a great predictor of whether you win or not, and the longer a (symmetric) war lasts, the better is this approximation working.

Now Russia makes far, far more weaponry. Therefore, it is winning. As simple as that. The sheer quantity of armaments is more than compensating for its tactical and operational shortcomings, for the coup-optimised cadre policy et cetera. You outproduce, outgrind and eventually overcome.

How can Russia produce so much?

Let’s consider one singular example. An air defence missile S400. The enormous quantity of air defence weaponry is a major tool of Russian superiority on the battlefield. Countering the enemy airforce and projectiles, air defence systems cover the Russian ground forces from every possible aerial threat. They effectively bar activities of the enemy airforce, creating vast zones of exclusion over Ukraine.

S400 missiles launch

Within large exclusion zones, Russian airforce can work freely, covered from aerial threats

The Russian production of air defence weaponry has been effectively monopolised by the Almaz-Antey corporation. It has been the richest Russian military producer, and by far the most successful exporter of weaponry in the country. In order to get an insight into the Almaz-Antey production, we will take an excursion into their factory floor, at the MMZ Avangard plant.

The MMZ Avangard in the Almaz-Antey structure. This diagram represents only a sample of the Almaz-Antey enterprises, rather than all of them (over 50 overall)

S400 missiles at the MMZ Avangard factory floor, 2022

Production of a missile includes a broad range of production processes, such as:

1. Casting

Casting is pouring the liquid metal into a form (mould/die). This is the cheapest way of mass production by far. Most of mass scale casting at the Russian military industry is unautomated, and that is fine. It is essentially an Iron Age technology

2. Pressing, forging, stamping

Shaping metal with compressive force to increase its strength and/or give it a desired form falls under the pressing/forging/stamping category. Russians call these machines “pressing-forging equipment”. In English, they are usually called “forming tools”. Most of them are relatively ancient. Transition to the computer control affected forming processes less

3. Machining

Removing the excessive metal from a workpiece to create a component of necessary shape and size is called machining. Compared with other metalworking processes, it allows for far greater precision. Most parts of tight control and convoluted geometry must necessarily be machined. Consequently, machining is most of what a missile plant is doing.

4. Coating

Coating is covering a component with a surface layer, either to prevent corrosion (the simplest case), or to increase surface strength, reduce friction, etc. A very broad range of processes, some of which are automated, others are not

5. Assembly

Assembly, wiring, etc. is almost never automated. It is usually low paid female manual labor

This brief introduction gives you a very basic understanding of the production chain that the missile manufacture is based upon. And the main chokepoint in the entire chain lies here. It is the machining.

Why?

• First, because machining is most of what a missile plant (aircraft plant, etc) is doing. As components of high precision must be machines, it is machining that the execution of a missile’s mechanical design primarily relies upon

• Second, because it is the most digitised and software dependent production process. Assembly is almost always done manually. Casting, pressing, forging, etc. is often done (or can be done) on the old, manually operated equipment. Machining cannot (See why)

• Third, because Russian capacity to conduct machining relied upon the constant shipments of parts, consumables from and tech support from the West. Without this supplies and services the Russian machining base it inoperable (China is not an alternative)

Consider the MMZ Avangard. Its machining base does not include the tools imported from the developed world. It consists of them.

An MMZ Avangard workshop manager Sergey Furashov is standing near the Hyundai-Wia L 150 SY CNC Lathe (Korea) equipped with the Fanuc (Japan) CNC controller

Let’s have a look at the MMZ Avangard corporate report for 2012 (published in 2013). Why do we take a 2013-released documents? Because after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the plant became less transparent (for obvious reasons) and stopped releasing reports to the general public. So, it is the very last glimpse from the era they were relatively transparent.

The 2012 report lists the following machining equipment on their balance sheet:

🇨🇭Switzerland: Center lathe machine tool “SCHAUBLIN” model 150A; Universal milling machine tool “SCHAUBLIN” model “53N”; Spark-erosion machine tool “AGIE” model “AGIETRON 370C” [now “GF machining solutions”]

🇩🇪 Germany: universal milling machine “DECKEL” model “FR3”; Five Axis Vertical Milling Machining Center "Spinner U5-620" with CNC "Heidenhain TNC 620+HSCI" panel

🇮🇹 Italy: Flat grinding machine “ROSA” model “RTRC 1200”;

🇪🇸 Spain: Spark-erosion machine tool “ONA” model “KE 500”;

🇺🇸 USA: Coordinate boring machine “SIP” model “MP 3 K” [“Hauser”], coordinate grinding machine “HAUSER” model “S 50 DR”;

🇯🇵 Japan: Spark-erosion machine ROBOCUN-0iD (Fanuc)

🇰🇷 South Korea: Vertical machining center “DNM 500” (VT-40) “DOOSAN”, vertical machining center “DNM 650” (VT-40) “DOOSAN”

🇹🇼 Taiwan: Circular grinding machine "JHU-4010H", circular grinding machine "JHU-2706H", profile grinding machine "Techmaster 634 Easy", radial drilling machine "WJR1112S", surface grinding machine "JL-6020 AHR", Vertical machining center “LG-500AP”; Vertical machining center “TORNADO HCMC 15AP”

This list is very important. It gives a great first insight into how did the Russian military manufacturing base looked, and, to a very significant degree, still looks like. What do we see here?

Leading position of Western Europe. Combined with Japan, the Western Europe makes for the lion share of high end equipment on the Russian military plants. That is because it counts for the lion share of high equipment machinery supply in the world (See here).

Catching development position of Taiwan and South Korea. They provided Russian with sufficiently good lower end equipment, but were weaker in the higher end. That is because Taiwanese and Korean machines were inferior in quality and technology.

Industrial role of the USA. Retaining capacity to produce a range of high end machines, the USA lost most of its capacities. It is no longer a leading producer quantitatively speaking. Therefore, it plays a minor role as a supplier of the Russian military industry

All of this is expectable, as the absence of Russian-made equipment in the list. The post-Soviet collapse ruined Russian machine tool production and the technological disruption (transition to computer control) finished it. Starting from 2003, Putin rearmed the military industry with the CNC machines from the developed world, putting the military production on a constant needle of spare parts, consumables and tech support from abroad.

What is interesting, and somewhat unexpected is the brilliant absence of China.

There is nothing Chinese in the list

Nothing at all