1. Russia makes more weaponry than its enemies. If nothing is done about its military production, Russia will likely win this war
2. Establishing the new rule of politics:
Always bet against the US allies
3. That will have the absolutely destructive effect on the US policy and standing in Asia
4. The Russian victory in Ukraine will radically devalue the worth of the US alliance in the eyes of the world
5. Yes, America lost asymmetric wars before. But those were the asymmetric wars. This will be the first time, it is defeated in the symmetric warfare
6. Its standing will be adjusted accordingly
7. Yes, never bet against the US rule will stand for a while (don't declare the war, don't attack the US soil)
8. But now it will be supplemented with always bet against the US allies
9. Promises, guarantees and commitments are not worth much. And not because America is treacherous, but because it is weak. Being weak it backs off easily
10. The world is guided not so much by the "rational choice" (pure abstraction, disconnected from reality), as by impressions (real thing, actually exists)
11. Previous defeats in the asymmetric warfare may have raised a suspicion of weakness
12. But the belief in the US ability to win a symmetric war has never been really questioned since 1991
Now it will be
13. In the post war reality, the world will be governed by the new impression:
The US is withdrawing from the symmetric wars, because it cannot win them
13. And the US commitments are not worth much, because the US is incapable of fulfilling them
14. Should Ukraine lose, the Asian countries will have every reason to fear that the following scenario in the Pacific:
A. The US give promises they cannot and therefore will not fulfil
B. You stand against the invader
C. You get steamrolled
D. You are left to your fate among ashes and ruins
Why not accept your fate now, skipping the ashes & ruins part?
15. Should Ukraine lose, I expect "standing up against China" becoming a politically indefensible position in Taiwan
16. The preventive lowkey surrender will look as the only reasonable & responsible choice from the Taiwanese standpoint
17. With a good degree of certainty, you may consider Taiwan as gone
18. Yes, there are strong reasons for the US to avoid a potential escalation with Russia
19. But most of these reasons apply to an escalation with China, perhaps even to a greater degree
20. Therefore, we can expect the US to be less decisive about China than it is about Russia
21. Overall, defeat in Ukraine will vastly undermine the US political standing in Asia
22. Its allies will be under impression that the US is either uncommitted to winning or incapable to win. Probably, both
23. While China seems to be committed to win at any cost
Only a fool will stand on its way
24. Now an interesting thing is that the US have every chance to win. That is because the supply chain for precision metalworking equipment is controlled by its allies
25. And metalworking is how you make weaponry. No, it's not all about microchips. Production of complex weaponry such as an intercontinental ballistic missile is primarily constrained by the metalworking capacity. And metalworking capacity is mostly precision machining capacity
SLBM Sineva, Krasmash Plant made
Krasmash production processes. It’s machining, for most part
Almost all missile parts from the engine to the body must be machined
26. Now what you need to understand about machining is that it is the most digitised production process in the entire chain. And for this very reason, it is the most import reliant. Russian capacity for the production of weaponry is heavily reliant on its capacity to machine. The Russian capacity for machining, in its turn relies upon the import of equipment, parts, consumables from and the tech support by the US allies for the lack of alternative.
In late 20th c. machining has rapidly switched from the manual to computer control, making the process far more productive, consistent and requiring less qualified labor input
Consider a single example: the Kalinin Machine Building Plant. Now part of the Almaz Antey corporation, it has been a major producer of air defence missiles in Russia
1976: manually operated, steel instruments, often domestically produced
2012: computer controlled, carbide instruments, nearly 100% Western import
27. Transition to the computer control had a double effect on catching development powers:
a) Allowed them to produce precise parts (-> weaponry) cheaper and more consistently than before
b) Widened the gap with the leading global producers of machinery too far, to be realistically bridged in the foreseeable future
Long story short, it made the military production of the developing world more efficient, but at the same time absolutely import and tech support dependent.
28. And China is a catching development power itself. It cannot substitute for the Western import, and won't be able for a while. It may produce more lasers than anyone. But when you want a precision laser cutter, you are not gonna buy Chinese
You gonna buy Trumpf (Germany)
29. Western machine tool producers may not be technically breaking sanctions. That is because sanctions are designed not to work. Trumpf for example, continued supporting its laser cutting equipment in Russia well into this war and is almost certainly continuing it now
30. Once again, it's not about Western producers "breaking sanctions". It is about Russian capacity for metalworking (= weaponry production) being almost fully based upon the equipment imported from the US allies between 2003-2023
If you want to make an S300 erector...
... You will need a Tos Varnsdorf (Czechia) machine
Production of metalworking equipment has been outsourced to the West, long, long before this war started
31. How can Russia even continue producing complex weaponry if we don't see the Russian machinery around? Where is Russian machinery?
People with above room temperature IQ have been asking this question for long, long time
32. And if your ruling class has not been asking this question, that is not because it is "dumb", but because it consists of low curiosity people
They are not really low in intelligence. They are just low in curiosity
33. People on top spend half of their life forcing their way to the top and the second half guarding their position
You spend your youth climbing the ladder, and maturity kicking the ladders away
There is no time for curiosity or pursuing any sort of deep personal interest
34. Our social hierarchies select for high ambition low curiosity people. Productive, socially intelligent, people on the top tend to be shockingly narrow minded
They can't think out of the box, because they don't have out of the box knowledge. They never had time to acquire it
35. A life spent in acquiring unobvious knowledge is the life not spent in forcing your way to the top of the hierarchy. And vice versa, a life spent acquiring the knowledge that allows you to even ask the right questions will not lead you on top
I don’t think its our political elites don’t have the will, its that they are constrained politically. But its a great point about Western elites in general & low curiosity. Absolutely. It is this dynamic that has allowed for our elections to be so exploited by foreign influence.
Much of our politics have been captured by populists under the influence of the Kremlin. Since the populists can de facto veto military aid and also regurgitate the Kremlin’s propaganda, it maybe appears that its the political elites balking. But it seems from on the inside, to me at least, Russia is winning informational and political warfare, and Western elites are losing control of our governance. If Biden and gang overextended, the populists will win power and that will be how Russia wins this conflict. My 0.02 anyway.
Thanks for the valuable insights
Given the obvious military might of South Korea, and the remilitarization of Japan, I doubt your political analysis of Taiwan. Surely Taiwan could simply supply itself from South Korea and Japan? If China attacked South Korea, South Korea would certainly fight on forever no matter how powerful China was. (See Vietnam.) Taiwan has already been actively preparing its own defenses under the assumption that it can't depend on the US.
China's government will look inward, as it's facing endless climate disasters within its internationally recognized borders. It might try to grab territory from the collapsing Russian Empire. Maybe the Chinese leadership would pick a fight with Taiwan, out of habit, but they'd lose *even if Taiwan had no US support* -- Taiwan has very much set up very specifically to destroy any air or sea invasion attempts, and you can't get there by land.
The Chinese empire is an anachronism which looks liable to fall apart at any time, much like the Russian and the American. These sorts of empires don't appear to be stable in the current social and technological state.
I don't think Russia can win in Ukraine anyway because I'm watching the Russian government dig into 1950s stockpiles and import from North Korea and Iran. I don't think Russia actually *can* make more weaponry than its enemies -- as long as Poland supports Ukraine and South Korea supplies Poland. Perun's deep dives into Russian military production don't indicate high production capacity compared to South Korea, let alone South Korea plus anyone else.
The question of why Russia is unable to match South Korean production capacity is one you have actually explained quite well in the past.